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Abstract-In many countries the concept of capitating health care insurers is receiving increasing attention. 
The main reason is, that capitation may induce health care insurers in a competitive environment o 
concentrate more on cost containment. However, if the adjusters on which capitation payments are based, 
are too global, there may be ample room for risk selection by the insurers whilst also an unfair distribution 
of funds over the insurers may result, thereby undermining the objectives of capitation. 
The prime motivation for the present study is, that the Dutch government, as part of proposals for a 
new, market oriented structure of health care system, is considering to capitate insurers on the basis of 
global parameters like age, gender and location. Our analysis based on panel data of some 35,000 
individuals, shows that the proportion of variance in annual health care expenditures that can be predicted 
(R*) by such a global capitation formula, is only 0.024. This is less than l/S of our estimate of the 
theoretically maximum achievable R’ which amounts to 0.138, implying the existence of abundant selection 
opportunities, e.g. on the basis of past expenditures or other health indicators. 
Alternative capitation formulae incorporating prior-year’s costs and reaching about 3/5 of the maximum 
obtainable RI, effectively remove the profitableness of selection on the basis of past expenditures. The 
findings suggest, however, that selection via (chronic) health status may still be profitable to some extent. 
Therefore, we also analyzed data from the Dutch Health Interview Survey (N z 20,000) which comprised 
better health indicators. It appeared that a capitation formula based on the global adjusters mentioned 
above as well as three health status indicators and several background characteristics, yields an R’ of about 
0.114, which probably accounts for 3/4 of our estimate of the maximum obtainable R*. 
The main conclusion is, that in the short Iem information on prior expenditures, which is available in 
the files of most insurers and thus may be used for risk selection, should be included in the capitation 
formula. For the more distant future, the formula should be expanded with indicators of chronic health 
status, possibly based on diagnostic information from previous, non-discretionary hospitalizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States of America (U.S.) it is well 
established among researchers, that the Adjusted 
Average Per Capita Cost (AAPCC) method used in 
the Medicare program for paying capitated delivery 
systems, is unfair and stimulates risk selection. Vari- 
ous studies have shown that major improvements can 
be achieved by extending the set of adjusters-which 
presently comprise age, gender, welfare status, insti- 
tutional status and county-with measures of prior 
use or costs or, better still, measures fo chronic health 
status. In the Netherlands, however, we seem to be 
lagging behind some 10 years with respect to both the 
research in this area and the political discussion: 
while it seems generally acknowledged in the U.S. 
that the adjusters mentioned are insufficient, the 
Dutch government intends to use just these type of 
risk factors for capitating all health insurance organ- 
izations in a new, market oriented structure of the 
Dutch health care system [l]. 
Policy proposals 
In the late 80’s the Dutch government started the 
implementation of a national health insurance based 
on regulated competition in the private sector [ 11. The 
benefits package will be broad, covering about 96% 
of all acute and long term care. Qualified insurers will 
receive for each of their insured a premium-replacing 
(capitation) payment from a Central Fund, which, in 
its turn, will be filled with mandatory income-depen- 
dent premiums, to be paid to the tax-collector. 
Qualified insurers are obliged to have an open enrol- 
ment period once every two years and to obey other 
procompetitive regulation. The capitation payment is 
independent of the chosen insurer and will be equal 
to the risk-adjusted per capita costs of the covered 
benefits for the risk group to which the insured 
belongs, minus a fixed amount. This fixed amount is 
equal for all individuals and will be about 11% of the 
average per capita costs of the covered benefits. The 
deficit created by this deducted fixed amount is met 
by a flat rate premium to be paid by the insureds 
directly to the insurer of their choice. The difference 
between the actual costs and the risk-adjusted capita- 
tion payment will not be the same for all insurers and 
will be reflected in the flat rate premium that the 
competing insurers will quote. This creates the incen- 
tive for insurers to be efficient. For sake of solidarity 
between healthy and unhealthy people an insurer is 
obliged to quote the same flat rate premium to all his 
insureds who choose the same insurance option. A 
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voluntarily chosen deductible may reduce this pre- 
mium. Insurers will be allowed to contract selectively 
with providers and to offer different insurance op- 
tions as do, for instance, HMOs, preferred provider 
organisations or traditional health insurers, provided 
the insurance conditions conform to legally described 
insurance rights. 
Capitation payments 
The main objective of this article is to show that in 
the Dutch context global capitation formulae for 
acute care are inadequate because: (1) they are unfair, 
i.e. overpaying insurers with relatively healthy in- 
sureds and underpaying others; and (2) they encour- 
age insurers to select against those whose health care 
costs are predictably above their capitation payment. 
A second objective is to investigate more compre- 
hensive formulae that may reduce these problems. 
Procompetitive regulation as another strategy for 
reducing at least the consequences of the second 
problem, is not considered here [2]. 
To some extent this study, based on Dutch data, 
can be seen as a replication of similar U.S. studies. A 
major difference, however, is the combination of 
surcey and claims data for a large group of people of 
all ages. The data sources provide the opportunity to 
study the predictive performance of capitation for- 
mulae based solely on claims data, for groups formed 
on survey information. This may indicate whether it 
is possible to construct a start-up capitation formula 
[3] based solely on (administrative) data that is 
already available, so that no additional data collec- 
tion would be necessary. 
The next section shows that global adjusters such 
as age, gender and region, leave substantial room for 
risk selection. The analysis uses a panel dataset 
comprising information over a period of 5 years on 
the annual health care expenditures of some 35,000 
continuously enrolled privately insured individuals. 
For a subgroup (N = 14,000) additional survey data 
is available on indicators of health status in the base 
year. The survey data is employed in the third section 
to assess the ability of capitation formulae based on 
claims data (namely prior costs), to predict [4] cor- 
rectly the costs for groups formed on health status 
indicators. Subsequently, the addition of indicators 
of (chronic) health status to the set of global adjusters 
is investigated on the basis of cross-section data from 
the Dutch Health Interview Survey (N 2 20,000). In 
comparison to the panel dataset, more comprehen- 
sive health status indicators are available, thus 
providing the opportunity to explore the performance 
of capitation formulae based on, among other things, 
a crude variant of Diagnostic Cost Groups [4]. 
GLOBAL CAPITATION 
Panel data 
The panel data used in this section stem from 
“Zilveren Kruis”, the largest private health insurance 
organization in the Netherlands. The data refer to 
some 50,000 insured individuals and comprise infor- 
mation on their annual health care expenditures and 
insurance coverage over a period of 5 consecutive 
years (1976-1980). To prevent interpretation prob- 
lems, individuals who, for some reason or another, 
left the insurance organization during the 5-year 
period considered, are excluded from the analyses. 
This implies that approximately 30% of the obser- 
vations are dropped [5] and therefore, the analyses 
are performed on data from about 35,000 individuals. 
The annual health care expenditures include the costs 
of inpatient room and board, and of both inpatient 
and outpatient specialist care and ancillaries. It does 
not comprise the cost of drugs prescribed by phys- 
icians and care provided by a family doctor because 
these are covered (and thus recorded by the insurance 
company) only for people with a supplementary G.P. 
insurance (about 40% of the insured). Also, those 
insured individuals with a supplementary luxury in- 
surance, which covers the expenses of treatment in a 
(semi-) private room in the event of hospitalization, 
have higher total costs by definition because per-diem 
prices for this type of accommodation are higher. 
In an explorative analysis, the 35,000 persons in the 
basic dataset have been classified into six groups 
according to their 1976 costs. Subsequently, their 
expenditures in following years have been computed. 
The so-called ‘cost ratios’ presented in Table I are 
defined as the average expenditures in the group 
Table I. Ratios of mean cost 10 overall mean cost for groups formed on 1976 cost 
1976 
Cost ratio = group mean;overall mean 
Cosl interval !\’ Mean cost _ 
in Dfl.’ (%) I” DR. 1977 I 978 1979 1980 
0 60. I % 0 0.51 0.63 0.64 0.68 
I-250 20. I 97 0.96”‘ 1.03”’ 1.12 I .02”’ 
251-500 6.0 362 I .46 I .45 1.39 I .3a 
501-1000 5.1 698 I .9s 2.07 l.a5 1.85 
1001-2500 3.8 I 548 2.30 I .94 2.21 I .99 
> 2500 4.9 7417 4.61 3.03 2.64 2.71 
Total (N 7) 34,947 497 I I I I 
Overall meansb Dfl.513 DR.583 DR.664 DR.779 
“In Dutch florms; I U.S. dollar is worth about DR.l.90 (April 1991). 
The last row gives overall mean costs for each of the 4 years. 
“‘hk statistically significant (I-tesl, P = 0.05) difference between group mean and overall mean. 
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concerned divided by the average xpenditures for all 
persons in that specific year. These ratios implicitly 
correct for inflation and for the effects of aging in the 
cohorts. 
The cost ratios for the period 1977-1980 show a 
strong tendency to move towards the value of 1. This 
is an illustration of the ‘regression towards the mean’ 
phenomenon: if people are grouped according to 
their health care expenditures in a certain year, the 
group means have a tendency to move towards the 
total mean over time [6]. However, the first row 
shows that individuals with zero expenditures in the 
base year are, on average, still 32% below the overall 
mean four years later. Those with expenditures above 
Dfl.2,500 in 1976 have 171% higher expenditure in 
1980 than the average insured individual. Over the 
entire period of 4 years, the expenditures of the first 
group are 40% below, and those of the latter 200% 
above average. 
These findings are comparable to those of Lubitz 
et al. [7] and Beebe [S]. Before drawing too strong a 
conclusion, one has to realize that older people are 
probably over-represented in the higher cost groups 
whilst the opposite holds for the lower cost groups. 
Below corrections for these and other differences in 
the composition of these groups will be studied. 
Theoretically maximum obtainable R’ 
It has been shown [6, 1 l] that there exists a theor- 
etical upper bound on the percentage of variance in 
health care expenditures that one may ever hope to 
predict. Such a maximum can used as a yardstick for 
comparing R% obtained in practice: the narrower 
the gap between this maximum and the R2 for a 
certain capitation formula the smaller are the possi- 
bilities for risk selection. With panel data available, 
it is possible to estimate, on the basis of error 
components models, this theoretical maximum. We 
have tested three of the models that are suggested in 
the literature for this purpose on our panel dataset: 
a variance components model, an autoregressive 
model and a mixed autoregressive-variance com- 
ponents model. These models were, however, both 
theoretically and empirically outperformed by a com- 
bination of an autoregressive model with an (ad- 
justed) first-order moving-average model. On the 
basis of that model the theoretical maximum R’ was 
estimated bo be 13.8% [lo]. This is comparable to 
other studies on this subject [6, 1 I]. 
Global capitation formulae 
Table 2 gives the specifications of three global 
capitation formulae that were estimated on the panel 
dataset. The set of adjusters in these formulae is 
restricted to those risk factors that were initially 
considered by the Dutch government, i.e. age, sex, 
insurance coverage and region. The inclusion of 
insurance coverage and region in two of these models 
does not imply that insurers will be compensated 
completely for the extra costs associated with, for 
Table 2. Three alternative models for capita&n formulae’ 
Adjusters I II III 
Age/sex (3 1 dummies) X X X 
Supplementary insuranceb X X 
Province (I I dummies) X 
Explained variance (R’ x 100) 2.0% 2.3% 2.4% 
‘Results are from linear regressions of expenditures on the respective 
sets of risk factors, estimated by OLS on all available person- 
years of data (N t 200.000). 
this concerned two dummy variables that indicate whether one has 
a supplementary insurance for GP care and prescription drugs, 
and whether one is covered for the extra costs of treatment in 
a (semi-) private room in the event of hospitalization. 
instance, the possibility of a higher propensity to 
consume medical care by people with GP insurance 
or living in certain areas. In general, as far as these 
and other effects do not reflect differences in health 
status they should not be accounted for at all [9]. 
However, in view of the degree of acceptance of a 
capitation formula when introduced, it seems impera- 
tive to allow for these effects completely, at least in 
the short term. 
The bottom line of Table 2 shows that age and sex 
explain 2.0% of the expenditure variance, or about 
l/7 of our estimate of the maximum explainable 
variance (= 13.8%). This is somewhat better than the 
findings with respect to the AAPCC variables pre- 
sented by Lubitz et al. [7] and Newhouse et al. [ll], 
who reported R2 values of around 1%. The higher R2 
value can be traced to: (1) the more elaborate specifi- 
cation of age and sex in our study (with 31 dummies); 
and (2) the fact that we analyze all age-groups, 
whereas Lubitz et al. study people of 65 years and 
over, and Newhouse et al. analyze people between 14 
and 65 years old. The variance explained by the least 
global of the three models in Table 2 amounts to only 
about l/6 of the maximum, thus probably leaving 
substantial room for risk selection. In the next sub- 
section we shall investigate the opportunities for risk 
selection using prior costs and health indicators, 
given a global model. 
Predictive performance 
Employing the global capitation formula given by 
model III, the cost ratios of Table 1 have been 
recalculated. The cost ratio for a particular group is 
now defined as the quotient of the mean costs actually 
incurred by that group and the mean costs predicted 
by model III (Table 3). In this way, differences in 
composition among the groups with respect o age, 
sex, insurance coverage and region are accounted for. 
The results suggest hat the highest cost group prob- 
ably comprises a large proportion of older people 
since in comparison to Table 1 the cost ratios for this 
group have dropped markedly. As expected, the cost 
ratios of most groups in most years have moved 
closer to one. Also, the number of cost ratios that do 
not differ significantly from one, has increased. How- 
ever, the results are of the same tenor: the sharpest 
movement owards the mean occurs in the first year 
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Table 3. Ratios of actual to predicted mean costs (model III) for groups formed on 1976 cost’ 
1976 
Cost ratio = actual/predicted group mean 
Cost interval N Mean cost 
in Dfl. Vo) in DR. 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Total costs 
0 60. I % 0 0.57 0.70 0.71 0.76 
I-250 20. I 97 0.92”’ 0.99”’ I .08”’ 0.98”’ 
25 l-500 6.0 362 I .22 I.21 1.15”‘ 1.15”’ 
501-1000 I .67 . 5.1 698 I .58 I.50 1.49 
1001-2500 3.8 1584 I .93 1.64 I.87 1.70 
> 2500 4.9 7417 3.30 2.16 1.88 I .93 
Or 9 I I % IO1 0.79 0.90 0.92 0.92 
I-2500 4.7 1452 1.93 1.39 I .35 I .43 
> 2500 4.2 802 I 3.41 2.10 1.84 I .82 
Ourparienr COSlJ 
0 61.3% 48 0.61 0.71 0.72 0.77 
I-500 30.2 653 1.47 I.10 1.14 I .07”’ 
> 500 8.4 3221 2.37 2.09 I .96 I .92 
“See the footnotes of Table I. 
“‘No statistically significant (f-test, P = 0.05) difference between actual and predicted mean cost. 
after the base year, after that the lowest and highest 
cost groups continue to move towards the mean but 
at a much slower pace. From the perspective of an 
insurance company, individuals in the group with 
zero costs in 1976 represent good risks, those with 
costs above the 1976 average Dfl.500 are bad risks. In 
the four year period after 1976, selection in favour of 
people from the zero-cost group would yield an 
insurance company an average profit of about 30% 
on the (global) capitation payment. Selection against 
people from the groups above Dfl.500 would result in 
avoiding a loss of over 50% per person per year for 
the period after 1976. Even if there occurs further 
regression towards the mean after 1980, the gains in 
this four year period seem lucrative enough for 
insurers to consider selection strategies. 
Table 3 also shows cost ratios for groups that are 
formed on inpatient and outpatient costs in 1976. In 
the long term the predictive value of outpatient costs 
in the base year appears to be larger than that of 
inpatient cost. For example, the cost ratio in 1980 
for individuals with 1976 inpatienf costs above 
D&2,500 is 1.82, whereas the (larger) group with 1976 
outpatient costs above Dfl.500 has a cost ratio of 1.92 
in 1980. Similarly, the fact that certain people have 
zero inpatient costs in 1976 is less informative for 
predicting future health expenditures (the ratio in 
1983 is 0.92) than are zero outpatient costs (the ratio 
in 1980 is 0.77). 
Previous studies have suggested that various as- 
pects of outpatient care, such as psychiatric care and 
physiotherapy, may be highly correlated with perma- 
nent health status (e.g. Ref. [12]). Separate analyses 
for both cost components, showed that indeed any- 
one who incurred expenditure in 1976 for these types 
of care, had higher than expected total costs in each 
of the four subsequent years. In the last year (1980) 
the differences were still 50% for psychiatry and 
100% for physiotherapy. 
The conclusion is that, given global capitation 
payments, health care expenditures in a certain base 
year have predictive value over a period of four 
years. Since the trends in cost ratios are rather 
stable, the same conclusion may hold for even longer 
periods. This clearly shows that in this situation 
insurers are able to identify from among their 
insured population those individuals who can be 
expected to have future costs that are consistently 
above or below their capitation payment. Since 
this type of data is readily available to insurance 
companies, it is not too far fetched to imagine that 
they will implement selection strategies based on 
this information. Thus, a global model is inadequate 
with respect to the prevention of selection oppor- 
tunities. It is important to ask what insurers may gain 
by risk selection, when the capitation formula 
also takes total prior costs and health status 
into account. In the next sections this issue will be 
addressed. 
CAPITATION FOR,MULAE INCORPORATING 
PRIOR COSTS 
Longitudinal and survey data 
In this section we address two questions: (1) how 
close can a formula comprising prior costs and some 
global adjusters achieve the theoretical maximum R* 
of 0.138?; and (2) if there remains a gap between 
explained variance and its theoretical maximum, how 
can insurers take advantage of it? Presumably, the 
best opportunities for risk selection, when this more 
refined capitation formula is implemented, lie in using 
better indicators of permanent health status. This 
section addresses these questions using that part of 
the database for which we have additional data from 
a postal enquiry held in the base year, 1976 
(N z 14,000). The extra information refers to health 
status (number of days of illness in 6 months and 
perceived health status relative to the previous 2 
years), medical consumption (number of consul- 
tations with the family doctor and medical specialists 
in 6 months, and costs of drugs prescribed by 
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Table 4. Ratios of actual to predicted mean costs (model 111-2) for groups formed on various indicators of health 
status in 1976’ 
1976 Cost ratio = actual/predicted group mean 
Indicator/ 
(CL 
Mean cost Sum 
interval in DR. 1977 1978 1979 1980 ‘77-‘80 
1039 
Days of illness (6 months) 
0 73.4% 
I-14 21.4 
>I4 5.2 
Relalire heolrh skms b 
The same 85.9% 
Worse/better 14.1 
Physician consulra~ions (6 months) 
0 38.9% 
l-3 40.6 
>3 20.5 
Cosrs of prescriprion drugs (6 monrhs) 
0 56.7% 
I-100 33.6 
> 100 9.7 
Total (N=) 14,061 
Overall mean? 
261 
495 
3936 
0.80 
I.21 
2.61 
0.84 0.88 0.88 0.85 
1.14”‘ 0.96”’ 0.95”’ I .05”’ 
2.32 2.10 2.04 2.23 
348 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.90 
I546 1.73 I .48 1.50 I .47 I .53 
137 0.63 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.66 
329 0.80 0.95”’ 0.81 0.89 0.86 
1469 1.70 1.50 I.51 1.51 I .55 
242 
587 
I633 
517 
0.66 
I .05”’ 
1.93 
DR.513 
0.71 0.74 0.74 
0.99”’ 0.94”’ 0.93”’ 
1.81 I.81 I .90 
I I I 
DR.568 DR.669 DR.800 
0.72 
0.97”’ 
I .86 
DR.2550 
‘Predicted costs are calculated on the basis of age, gender, insurance coverage and region (model III-2 of Table 5). 
bHealth status in the last six months relative to that in the preceding 2 years (self-rated). 
Tithe last row gives overall mean costs for each of the 4 years. 
“‘No statistically significant (f-test, P = 0.05) difference between actual and predicted mean cost. 
physicians in 6 months), and socio-economic status 
(income, education and employment status). 
First we look at the ratio of actual to predicted 
costs for groups formed on the four health indicators 
and consumption variables mentioned above, where 
prediction is based on age, gender, insurance cover- 
age and region (Table 4). This provides a base for 
studying similar ratios with more precise predictions. 
We shall interpret the two consumption variables 
as health indicators as well, because many studies 
have found strong correlations between health status 
and outpatient care, especially prescription drugs 
(e.g. Refs [12, 131). 
Table 4 indicates that the number of days of illness 
in the first half of 1976, is still informative with regard 
to health care expenditures after a period of 4 years: 
individuals without illness and those with more than 
2 weeks of illness have expenditures in 1980 that 
are respectively 12% lower and 104% higher than 
expected in view of their age, gender, insurance 
coverage and region. Also, there is little movement of 
the cost ratios towards the overall value of 1 after 
1978. 
The interpretation of the variable “health status in 
the last 6 months relative to that of the preceding 2 
years” is not straightforward because no information 
is available on health status before 1976. However, it 
seems reasonable to assume that those individuals 
who indicate that their health has changed (either 
deteriorated or improved) have a general health status 
that is below average. This assumption is supported 
by the finding that the mean health care expenditures 
in 1976 for this group are well above average (column 
3 of Table 4). Besides, this variable proves to be a 
predictor of future costs as cost ratios are consistently 
above 1 for the rest of the study period. 
Table 4 also shows the predictive value of outpa- 
tient care; individuals with an above average number 
of physician consultations in the first half of 1976, 
have 51% higher health care expenditure in 1980 than 
predicted. Hardly any regression of the ratios 
towards the value of I occurs after 1978. A similar 
pattern can be observed for prescription drugs, where 
it is remarkable that individuals with more than 
Dfl. 100 expenses on this type of care in the base year 
have between 81% and 93% higher costs in the 
following four years, without there being a noticeable 
declining trend. Similarly, the ratios for the group 
without prescription drugs vary between 0.66 and 
0.74, also without a discernible trend. This supports 
the hypothesis that prescription drugs are a fairly 
good indicator of chronic health. 
Summarizing, the results show that each of the four 
health indicators has substantial predictive value in 
addition to the four global adjusters. The cost ratios 
for groups formed on the health indicators appear to 
level out after 1978, which is sooner than for the 
components of 1976 costs studied in Table 3. This 
suggests that the former are better predictors, with 
effects that may remain long after the study period. 
However, in view of the opportunities for manipu- 
lation of this type of information by insurers com- 
bined with problems of data-collection for the two 
direct health indicators, such information does not 
seem to qualify as adjuster in the capitation formula, 
at least not in the short term and in the present form. 
Capitation formulae extended with prior costs 
We shall now investigate more elaborate capitation 
formulae using the reduced dataset for which survey 
data is available. For reasons of comparison we start 
again with the least global of the three models of 
Table 5. Six alternative models for capitation formulae’ 
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Table 2, which were estimated on the complete 
database, i.e. model III. This model is denoted here 
by 111-2. Apart from the fact that we now use a 
subgroup of the original database, there is also a 
difference in the statistical model: the formulae of 
Table 2 were obtained from linear regressions 
whereas all formulae in the present section are esti- 
mated by means of a so-called two-part model. In an 
explorative, split-sample analysis using this dataset 
we studied the performance of several commonly 
used statistical models by which individual annual 
health care expenditures can be related to explana- 
tory variables [14]. The two-part model (with smear- 
ing estimator) was selected on the basis of the mean 
forecast error and the percentage of variance pre- 
dicted. This model involves the estimation of separate 
equations for the probability of having non-zero 
annual expenditures and, given positive expenditures, 
for the logarithm of expenditures. 
individuals in this particular database are mainly 
from the higher socio-economic classes, and whilst, 
moreover, they live primarily in the western part of 
the country, it is not justifiable to conclude from these 
results that such information is irrelevant with respect 
to capitation. 
As well as age, gender, insurance coverage, and 
region, model VI contains information on total prior 
costs. In view of the data that is presently recorded 
by Dutch (private) insurance companies, this model 
seems feasible as a capitation formula. The R’ value 
amounts to about 55% of the maximum achievable 
R’. This is compariable to the results reported by 
Newhouse et al. [l I] for a similar model. In this 
model the elasticity of capitation payment with re- 
spect to prior costs equals about 0.25. Thus. the 
cost-containment incentive for insurers would be only 
marginally affected when capitation were based on 
this model. 
The R2 value for model III-2 is, as it should be, Model VII differs from VI in that outpatient and 
almost equal to that of the corresponding model III inpatient care are distinguished and where, moreover, 
of the previous section. Models IV and V are minor the former adjuster is broken down into five com- 
extensions of 111-2. The first also includes employ- ponents. This model may not qualify as a capitation 
ment status and family size, two of the adjusters formula when these components have different effects 
suggested by a Dutch research institute that might on capitation payments, because that would create 
remedy selection opportunities inherent to model possibilities for manipulation. However, this type of 
III-2 [15]. Model V is additionally based on socio- data may be used by insurers to outperform the 
economic status (indicated by income and education), actual capitation formula, i.e. to distinguish good and 
and degree of urbanization. Each of these adjusters bad risks among their insured populations. The same 
may be seen as an indirecr indicator of health status, arguments hold for model VIII, which includes the 
which may perhaps be measured more reliably than four indicators of health status in 1976, as well as the 
direct indicators of health status such as the information contained in models V and VII. The 
presence/absence of certain chronic conditions. The refinements of models VII and VIII yield only small 
additional adjusters in the two models appear to increases in the percentage of explained variance 
give marginal improvements in R’. Since the insured as compared to model VI. Despite these small 
Adjusters III-2 IV v VI VII VIII 
. Age/sex x x x x x x 
supplementary insurance X x x x x x 
province x x x x x x 
l Employment status x x X 
family size x x X 
0 Income X X 
education level X X 
degree of urbanization (3 dummies) X X 
l Prior-year’s total costs (yes/no and logI > O)b X 
l Prior-year’s outpatient costs: 
-physiotherapy (yes’no) x x 
-psychiatry (yes/no) x x 
-medical devices (yes/no) x x 
--rest of outpatient costs (yes/no and log1 > O)b x x 
l Prior-year’s inpatient costs (yes/no and logi > O)b x x 
l Days of illness (log + I) X 
Relative health (dummy) X 
Physician consultations (log + I) X 
Prescription drugs (log + I) X 
Exolained variance CR’ x 100) 2.4% 2.7% 2.7% 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 
‘Every model is estimated for each of the four years (1977-1980) by means of the two-part method described 
in the text (N z 14,000). The R* values reported are averages for the 4 years, where the R’ for a single 
year is defined as I minus the ratio of residual variance to total variance. 
qhese prior cost variables are entered in both parts of the models concerned in the form of a dummy variable, 
indicating whether prior costs were zero, plus a variable that equals the logarithmic of these costs in case 
of non-zero costs. 
‘These adjusters refer to 1976. 
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improvements it may well be that these later models 
provide better cost estimates for groups that are most 
vulnerable to selection, i.e. people with chronic 
conditions. In this type of analysis, the explained 
variance-which is a quadratic measure of devi- 
ations-does not seem to be best criterion for judging 
the performance of rival models. Rather, the ability 
to predict correctly the costs for people with chronic 
conditions is of prime importance, i.e. a linear 
measure of deviations. The next subsection explores 
this subject. 
capitation formulae based on claims data can 
correctly predict expenditures for groups formed on 
health status, for example indicated by the variables 
analyzed in Table 4. The cost ratios presented in 
that table have been recalculated, where pre- 
dicted costs are now also based on prior total costs 
(Table 6). 
The proportion of variance explained by models VI 
and VII seems to indicate that even formulae based 
on prior expenditure leave ample room for risk 
selection. This may be caused by the large random 
variation in this adjuster: some people have high 
previous costs because of chronic conditions; for 
most others this is purely by chance. Consequently, 
a capitation formula including prior-year’s costs will 
systematically underpay the insurer for the former 
group, and overpay for the latter, this latter group 
having a different composition each year [16]. Thus, 
selection against people with chronic conditions will 
remain profitable. A possible solution to this problem 
is to adjust the capitation payment for (indicators of) 
chronic health. This option will be explored in the 
next section. 
Comparing the cost ratios of Table 6 with those of 
Table 4, reveals that model VI provides better predic- 
tions for the groups concerned than the global model 
111-2. For example, only 4, instead of 9, our of the 12 
cost ratios for the groups formed on days of illness 
are now statistically significant, and nearly all cost 
ratios have moved closer to 1. The group with more 
than two weeks of illness in 1976 is the only one for 
which there remain significant differences in each of 
the years after 1977. In 1980 this (small) group still 
has 54% higher costs than predicted, although this is 
substantially better than the 104% found in case of 
prediction via model 111-2. Over the whole four year 
period actual costs for this group are 44% above 
predicted costs. 
Predictive performance 
The cost ratios for 1980 for groups formed on 
relative health status have moved from 0.90 and 1.47 
for the global model 111-2, to 0.94 and 1.22 for model 
VI comprising prior costs as well as the four global 
adjusters. Besides, only one of the ratios remains 
significant. 
The important difference between claims data and 
survey data, such as days of illness or self-perceived 
health status, is that it will be harder to incorporate 
the latter type of information into a capitation 
formula whilst it is conceivable that insurers can 
obtain similar information-for instance in an 
HMO-setting-and use it to select risks. There- 
fore, it is important to investigate to what extent 
The cost ratios for groups formed on physician 
consultations in 1976 also show major improvements: 
the number of significant ratios is reduced from 11 to 
6 while all the ratios have moved towards 1. The 
group without consultations has a (significant) cost 
ratio in the last year of the study period of 0.86 as 
compared to 0.71 in Table 4. In that year the group 
with the most consultations has 21% more costs than 
expected as compared to 51% in Table 4. 
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Table 6. Ratios of actual to predicted mean costs (model VI) for groups formed on various indicators of 
health status in 1976’ 
1976 Cost ratio = actual/predicted group mean 
Indicator/ Mean cost Sum 
interval ($) in Dfl. 1977 1978 1979 1980 ‘77-‘80 
Days of illness (6 months) 
0 73.4% 261 0.94”’ 0.90 0.93”’ 0.92”’ 0.92 
I-14 21.4 495 I .06”’ 1.04 0.90”’ 0.91”’ 0.97”’ 
> I4 5.2 3936 1.18”’ 1.53 1.54 1.54 1.44 
Relative health status 
The same 85.9% 348 0.95”’ 0.97”’ 0.94”’ 0.94”’ 0.95 
Worse/better 14.1 I546 1.17 1.15”’ 1.24 1.22 1.20 
Physician consultations (6 months) 
0 38.9% 137 0.95” 0.78 0.79 0.86”’ 0.84 
l-3 40.6 329 0.91”’ 0.99N 0.80 0.91”’ 0.90 
>3 20.5 1469 1.10”’ 1.15 1.21 1.21 I.17 
Costs of prescription drugs (6 months) 
0 56.7% 242 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85 
I-100 33.6 587 0.97”’ 0.93N 0.90 0.90 0.92”’ 
>I00 9.7 1633 I .32 1.33 I .38 I .46 1.38 
‘Predicted costs are calculated on the basis of age, gender, insurance coverage, region and prior total costs 
(model VI of Table 5). Predictions for 1976 could not be calculated because no information was available 
on (prior) costs in 1975. The ratios in the last column are defined as the quotient of actual costs in the 
period 1977-1980 and predicted costs in that period. 
“‘No statistically significant (f-test, P = 0.05) difference between actual and predicted mean cost. 
Table 7. Ratios of actual IO predicted mean costs in 1980 for 3 models 
Indicator 
interval 
Cost ratio = actual/predicted group mean 
!vlean cost 
in Dfl. No adjusters Model III-2 Model VI 
IO-I' REsii: C. _I. A. VAN VLIET and WYSASD P. M. M. VAN DE VEX 
The least improvement has occurred for groups 
formed on prescription drugs: the number of signifi- 
cant ratios has dropped with only 2 in comparison to 
Table 4. IMoreover, the group with zero expenditures 
on prescription drugs in 1976 has about 15% lower 
total costs than predicted in each of the four sub- 
sequent years (this percentage is statistically signifi- 
cant); this was about 25% when prediction was not 
based on prior costs. For the group with the most 
prescribed drugs these figures are 35% and 85% 
respectively. 
status at their disposal, for example past expenses 
on prescription drugs and the diagnostic information 
of previous hospitalizations. It would be interesting 
to investigate the predictive ability of the latter 
type of data, for example by using the method of 
Diagnostic Cost Groups [4]. Unfortunately, the data- 
sets analyzed in this article do not contain such 
information. 
CAPITATION PAYUENTS INCORPORATING 
HEALTH INDICATORS 
Finally, Table 7 summarizes for nine groups the 
cost ratios for the last year of the study period, 
resulting from three models: a rudimentary model 
that does not contain any adjusters at all, the global 
model III-2 and model VI, comprising prior costs. 
The table shows that the profits (for insurers) on the 
zero cost groups reduce with about a factor l/3 when 
going from the simple model to the global model 
and fall further with about l/2 when prior costs are 
also taken into account. Similarly, the losses on the 
groups with the highest costs reduce with factors l/2 
and 112. Note that of the three grouping variables 
prescription drugs has the strongest predictive value: 
the ratio in model VI for the group without drugs is 
lower than those for the zero cost groups while the 
opposite holds for the group with the most drugs. 
Surwy data 
Summarizing, the findings of this section indicate 
that the addition of prior costs to the global capita- 
tion formula yields a major improvement in predic- 
tive ability. The potential profits and losses that 
insurers could incur for the groups that we have 
distinguished here, are about half of those in case of 
the global model 111-2. However, there are still 
groups. identifiable via health status indicators, for 
which insurers are systematically overpaid or under- 
paid. The cost ratios for the four-rather crude- 
indicators of health status analyzed in this section, 
suggest that, in those groups that are underpaid by an 
extended capitation formula, individuals with chronic 
conditions are over-represented. The relevance of this 
finding is that presently many Dutch insurers have 
similar or even better indicators of chronic health 
This section, based on van Vliet [ 131, examines the 
performance of capitation formulae incorporating 
measures of chronic health status as well as the 
potential benefits insurers could pocket if they were 
able to select on the basis of health indicators, given 
a global capitation payment. The analysis uses data 
from the Health Interview Survey (HIS), which is 
held annually by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
among representative samples of the non-institution- 
alized Dutch population. This article employs infor- 
mation from the about 20,000 respondents from 1981 
and 1982. The inquiry contains questions about 
health status, several background characteristics, and 
about the use of various medical care facilities, i.e. 
physiotherapy, GP care, prescription drugs, out- 
patient care by medical specialists and inpatient care. 
For the present study this information is comprised 
in an index of health care expenditures by combining 
utilization data with average prices. 
The HIS dataset has several advantages in com- 
parison with the dataset analyzed in the previous 
sections: (1) it comprises information on a representa- 
tive sample of the entire Dutch population and not 
just the insured individuals of one particular private 
health insurance organization; (2) it contains various 
indicators of (chronicj health conditions; and (3) 
more data on background characteristics is available. 
A major disadvantages of the HIS dataset is, that it 
does not contain longitudinal data on health care 
expenditures [ 181. 
Tooral COSIS 
0 56.3% 0 0.69 0.77 0.93”’ 
1-1000 34.5 241 1.16 I .06”’ 0.95”’ 
> 1000 9.2 4il6 2.33 I .79 I.31 
Oulpatienl CDSfS 
0 57.2% 31 0.69 0.77 0.93”’ 
l-500 33.5 605 1.06 0.98”’ 0.91”’ 
> 500 9.4 3162 2.69 1.94 1.35 
Costs ofprescriprion drugs 
0 56.7% 
I-100 33.6 
242 0.63 0.74 0.86 
587 0.96 0.93”’ 0.90 
>I00 9.7 1633 3.01 I .90 I .46 
“‘No statistically significant (f-test, P < 0.05) difference between actual and predicted mean 
Towards a capitation formula for competing health insurers 
It should be stressed here that the analyses in this 
section serve as an illustration of the predictive value 
of various proxies of chronic health status, i.e.: 
proxies for the actual information either insurers or 
the Central Fund that is responsible for the capitation 
system, could have excess to (e.g. prior cost or 
diagnostic information). We are nor suggesting that 
either parties could or should obtain the type of 
survey data used here. 
models IV-2 and V-2, which are similar to models IV 
and V of Table 5 and give comparable R’ values, 
supports this hypothesis. Our opinion is, therefore, 
that conclusions obtained from the two datasets are 
to a large extent comparable. 
Capitation formulae based on health indicators 
Below we discuss seven capitation formulae con- 
taining various combinations of the risk factors avail- 
able in the HIS dataset. The underlying models are 
not estimated, as in the previous section, by means of 
a two-part model, but via a four-part model, i.e. a 
two-part model for outpatient care and a separate 
two-part model for inpatient care. The main reason 
for this is a difference in time periods: outpatient care 
refers to the 3 months before the survey, whereas 
inpatient care refers to a 12 month period. The 
denotation in Table 8 of the seven alternative for- 
mulae corresponds with that of the previous sections, 
with models 111-3, IV-2 and V-2 being versions of III, 
IV and V respectively, estimated on this dataset. 
The difference in fit between models V-2 and III-3 
illustrates that background characteristics may in- 
deed play a role in a global capitation formula. This 
difference is considerably greater than that between 
similar models in the previous section, which is 
caused by the non-representative nature of the panel 
dataset analyzed there. 
Model III-3 is included in the analysis for reasons 
of comparison with models III and III-2 of the 
previous sections. The explained variance of model 
III-3 is almost equal to that of the two latter models, 
despite the above mentioned differences between the 
datasets on which the respective models are esti- 
mated. This suggests, that the strength of the relation- 
ship of the independent variables to both expenditure 
and utilization, is about the same. The results for 
Model V-2 is an extension of mode1 IV-2 with a 
broad spectrum of background characteristics instead 
of health indicators. This model is motivated by 
the idea that it might be possible to capture the 
effect of health status on health care expenditures 
by means of-measurable-variables that underlie 
health status itself, i.e. indirect health indicators [15]. 
The model, which also includes additional insurance 
variables as well as supply factors, yields an R2 value 
that is about half that for model IX, incorporating 
indicators of chronic conditions. This indicates that 
it is impossible to construct an adequate capitation 
formula that prevents risk selection without good 
indicators of health status. 
Models IX and X are other extensions of the basic 
model IV-2 in that they also contain indicators of 
chronic health status, i.e. chronic conditions weighted 
with expected costs, and physical impairments. 
The explained variance of these models shows the 
relevance of health with respect o costs: the R2 values 
are 2-3 times as high as those for the models without 
health status indicators. Moreover, the R2 for model 
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Table 8. Seven alternative models for capitation formulae 
Adjusters III-3 IV-2 v-2 IX X XI XII 
0 Age/sex X X X X X X X 
Insurance coverage’ X X X X X X X 
Region X X X X X X X 
l Employment status X X X X X X 
Family size X X X X X X 
l Socio-economic stat& X X 
Body weight’ X X 
Degree of urbanization X X 
Supply of care facilities X X 
Additional insurance coverage’ X X 
l Chronic conditions (wcighted)d X X X X 
Physical impairments X X X 
Self-rated general health status X X 
Explained variance (R* x 100) 2.8% 3.2% 3.1% 7.1% 1.1% 10.9% I I .4% 
‘Since the survey (N =z 20,COO) is held among a representative sample of the Dutch population the database 
comprises people with various health insurance plans. The adjuster ‘insurance coverage’ represents five 
variables that capture the major forms of coverage: sickness fund or private insurance (the former implies 
complete coverage for almost all types of medical care), coverage for GP care, coverage for outpatient 
specialist care, luxury insurance and level of deductible. The adjuster ‘additional insurance coverage’ 
represents three dummy variables that indicate whether the individual is covered for prescription drugs. 
for dentistry and for physiotherapy. 
bSocio-economic status is measured by profession (5 categories), income, education (6 levels) and ethnic 
minority. 
‘Body weight is adjusted for height and gender. 
dThc respondents were asked whether they suffered from one or more of 25 named chronic conditions; in 
addition there was an open category. The answers were weighted with the average medical consumption 
for each of the conditions. Some examples of these conditions are: rheumatism, heart conditions, 
hypertension, effects of stroke, diabetes, anaemia, asthma, hernia. cancer, serious consequences of 
accident. 
SSM 34i9-H 
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XI, which also contains self-rated general health 
status-perhaps a less objective measure of chronic 
illness-amounts to about three-quarters of what 
might be achievable. 
Finally, the most comprehensive model (XII) con- 
tains all the risk factors that are available in this HIS 
dataset. The explained variance is 11.4%, as com- 
pared to 10.9% for model XI, indicating that once 
health status is accounted for, the background 
characteristics are of little importance. The 11.4% 
achieved by model XII is distinctly better than the 
7.8% that was obtained for the models in the pre- 
vious section containing information on prior costs. 
This seems to support the hypothesis that, in the 
present context, direct indicators of health are prefer- 
able to more indirect indicators such as prior costs. 
Potential benefits of risk selection 
Until this point alternative models have been com- 
pared on the basis of their predictive performance, i.e. 
R2 values and ability to predict correctly the costs of 
specific groups of individuals. If we want to assess an 
upper bound on the short term pecuniary gains which 
insurance organizations may achieve by unlimited risk 
selection, assuming no costs and no repercussions 
from selection--e.g. in terms of a bad reputation-we 
may compare cupitation payments, based on a certain 
set of (global) adjusters, with COST predictions by 
insurers, based on a more comprehensive set of risk 
factors. Under the stated assumption it would be 
profitable for an insurer to reject all those applicants 
whose predicted costs are higher than their capitation 
payment (the bad risks) and to accept all the others 
(the good risks) (191. The average expected profit per 
applicant depends on: (I) the adjusters included in the 
capitation formula; and (2) the cost predictions that 
insurers can make on the basis of additional risk 
factors. In this subsection the selection process is 
simulated by assuming, first, that the capitation 
payments are calculated via model III-3 and then 
assessing the potential gains when insurers sub- 
sequently use the other models to make (better) cost 
predictions (201. Table 9 presents the results of this 
simulation. A second analysis simulates various 
alternative capitation formulae. 
With respect to the interpretation of Table 9, it is 
important to note that a selection model is potentially 
more interesting to an insurer the better it identifies 
(the small group of) people with high costs. This 
depends on the difference per risk group between 
predicted costs and capitation payment, and the size 
of the group of bad risks. Moreover, the assumptions 
stated above are less restrictive than they seem: in 
theory it would be most profitable for an insurer to 
reject all the bad risks and accept all the good risks. 
However, the results can also be interpreted as indi- 
cating the expected gain that he would incur if he 
succeeded in rejecting (resp. accepting) one represen- 
tative bad (resp. good) risk. Moreover, similar analy- 
ses for 1977 using the panel dataset of the previous 
sections, show that the profits of this selection pro- 
cedure are not restricted to the year in which selection 
takes place. It appears that for the once selected 
groups, the profits in each of the following three years 
amount to about half the potential gains in the first 
year. 
Table 9 shows that, given the global model 111-3, 
selection by an insurer based on family size and 
employment status (model IV-2) may lead to the 
evasion of average losses of 21% for the 30% of 
applicants whose capitation payments are below 
predicted costs. For model V-2, which contains all 
available risk factors except health indicators, this 
percentage is undoubtedly higher. However, the 
potential gains of selection via IV-2 and V-2 are 
relatively modest in comparison to selection via the 
other models: by using information on chronic con- 
ditions (model IX) the insurer could evade losses of 
96% on the capitation payments for individuals who 
represent bad risks (mainly people with chronic con- 
ditions). The remaining individuals, the good risks, 
have predicted costs that on average amount to only 
66% of their capitation payment, resulting in an 
expected profit of 34% of the capitation payment on 
Table 9. Potential urofits of risk selection liven a alobal cavitation uayment (model W-3) 
Percentaee Caoitation Predicted Percentaae 
Basis for selection 
model IV-2: good risksb 
bad risks 
model V-2: good risks 
bad risks 
model IX: good risks 
bad risks 
model X: good risks 
bad risks 
of sample payment 
70% 1458 
30 1442 
77 I500 
23 1297 
79 1373 
21 I746 
78 1271 
22 1673 
costs difference 
I329 -9% 
1739 21 
1229 -18 
2198 69 
912 -34 
3430 96 
807 -37 
3277 96 
model Xl: good risks 77 1365 766 -44 
bad risks 23 1748 3762 I15 
model XII: good risks 74 1392 754 -46 
bad risks 26 I626 3439 III 
‘Model III.3 is used to calculate the (average) capitation payment while the (average) predicted 
costs are calculated via models IV-2 to XII. Average predicred costs almost equal average 
actual costs. The last column gives the percentage difference between average predicted cost 
and average capitation payment. 
“Good (rcsp. bad) risks are defined as individuals with predicted costs below (resp. above) 
capitation payment. 
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each enrolled individual. These percentages increase 
further if self-rated health and physical impairments 
are also used to discriminate between good and bad 
risks (model XI). For model XII, comprising all 
available risk factors, the average gains remain about 
the same, but the group of bad risks increases. 
With regard to models IV-2 and V-2 it should 
be noted that, although the potential gains are 
small, the results have broader implica;ions than 
those of the other models because risk factors such 
as socio-economic status, urbanization and supply 
can be employed for marketing purposes. This allows 
risk selection to occur even before an individual 
applies for insurance. In contrast, selection according 
to, for instance, health status can take place at 
the moment of application at the earliest. Besides, 
the costs of selective marketing are presumably 
small, both in real terms and in terms of (a bad) 
reputation. 
We shall now simulate alternative capitation for- 
mulae so as to assess the maximum room for risk 
selection by using the best prediction available, i.e. 
based on model XII (Table IO). The starting point is a 
global model that accounts for age, gender, insurance 
coverage and region (model III-3), which is succes- 
sively extended with other adjusters. The results again 
confirm the inadequacy of global capitation pay- 
ments: the average predicted costs for the 26% of the 
sample who represent bad risks, are more than twice 
their average capitation payment. For the comp- 
lementary group of good risks the predicted costs are 
about half the capitation payment. These figures 
improve little if the payments are also based on 
employment status and family size (model IV-2). The 
same conclusion applies when all available risk 
factors except health indicators, are employed as 
adjusters (model V-2). Only the inclusion of health 
indicators reduces the potential profits of risk selec- 
tion by a significant degree: model X, which accounts 
for chronic conditions and impairments, reduces the 
underpayment of bad risks to 52%, and model XI, 
based also on self-rated health, further reduces this 
to 13%. 
It is interesting to note that the proportion of 
people labelled ‘bad risks’ is around 28% for all but 
the last selection and capitation model, indicating 
that an insurer who wants to apply selection strat- 
egies needs to consider only a minority of the appli- 
cants. This is, of course, a consequence of the fact 
that only a minority of the population suffers from 
chronic health problems. 
Finally, it appears that the capitation payment for 
the average bad risk is higher than that for the 
average good risk in nearly all cases examined. This 
suggests that the proportion of bad risks among 
people with high capitation payments is relatively 
high. Thus, an elementary selection strategy would be 
to restrict selection primarily to those groups. In an 
additional analysis, not presented here, this strategy 
indeed appeared to be profitable, i.e. the absolute 
differences between capitation payment and predicted 
costs for the average bad risk and the average good 
risk within fhese groups were considerably higher than 
those for the representative bad and good risks. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Generally speaking, this study, which employs 
Dutch panel and cross-section data, has produced 
results with respect o the capitation of health care 
insurers that are in line with findings of similar studies 
employing U.S. data-sources. This in itself is a re- 
markable finding in view of the large differences 
between the respective health care systems. It seems 
to imply that study results obtained in the U.S. are 
also relevant to the Dutch health care system. More- 
over, results may be applicable as well to other 
countries contemplating similar capitation systems, 
e.g. Australia, Germany, Israel, New Zealand and 
Switzerland [2]. 
The estimation on a panel dataset (N z 35,000) of 
a global capitation formula containing age, gender, 
Table IO. Potential profits of maximum risk selection given various cavitation formulae’ 
Cauitation formulae 
model 111-3: good risksb 14% 
bad risks 26 
model IV-2: good risks 74 
bad risks 26 
model V-2: good risks 74 
bad risks 26 
model IX: good risks 72 
bad risks 28 
model X: good risks 70 
bad risks 30 
model XI: good risks 56 
Percentage 
of sampL 
Caoitation 
payment 
Predicted 
costs difference 
I392 754 -46% 
1626 3439 III 
1383 771 -44 
1657 3433 107 
1352 827 -39 
1731 3235 87 
1335 936 -30 
I758 2790 59 
I260 895 -29 
IS92 2426 52 
1430 1277 -II 
Percentape 
bad risks 44 1482 I672 13 
‘Model XII, comprising all available risk factors, is used to calculate the (average) predicted costs 
while the (average) capitation payments are calculated on the basis of models III-3 to XI. 
Average predicred costs are approximately equal to average acruol costs. The last column 
gives the percentage difference between average predicted costs and average capitation 
payment. 
bGood (resp. bad) risks are defined as individuals with predicted costs below (resp. above) 
capitation payment. 
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insurance coverage and region, yielded an R’ value of 
only 0.024. This is less than 115 of the theoretically 
maximum achievable, which was estimated to be 
0.138. This implies that a global capitation formula 
will systematically met-pay for some groups and 
underpay for others and thus stimulate risk selection 
by insurers. It also will lead to unfair competition 
because at present he latter groupsTare not randomly 
distributed among the various Insurers. Several 
Dutch studies have shown, for example, that the 
(public) sickness funds have a relatively high pro- 
portion of bad risks (taking differences in age-sex 
distribution into account; cf. (211). Consequently, a 
global capitation formula is neither fair in the short 
term, nor will it achieve a stable insurance market in 
the long term. 
In view of the low R’ value for a model of global 
capitation, it is not surprising that it appeared to be 
highly lucrative for insurance companies to select 
among their present insured on the basis of past 
utilization and expenditure. As this type of infor- 
mation is readily available to every insurer, it is both 
imperative and administratively feasible to include 
prior total costs in the capitation formula in the short 
term. 
The inclusion of prior total costs as adjuster in 
the capitation formula, almost tripled the explained 
variance, which is now reaching a value of 0.071. 
Although this is more than half the maximum achiev- 
able value, the predictive performance of this capita- 
tion formula was poor for groups formed on four 
indicators of health status in the base year. For 
example, the subgroup (comprising some 10% of the 
study population) with more than Dfl.100 of expenses 
on prescription drugs in the base year, still had costs 
that were 47% above capitation payment 4 years 
later, the payment being based on 6 adjusters, namely 
age, gender, insurance coverage, region and prior 
total costs. Smaller but significant discrepancies were 
also found for groups formed on other types of health 
care costs and health indicators. The relevance of 
these findings in the context of risk selection is, that 
insurers can distinguish various types of expenditure. 
Moreover, many Dutch insurance organizations 
routinely collect better indicators of chronic health 
status than those used here, namely diagnostic 
information on (previous) hospitalizations of their 
insured. Thus, even such an advanced capitation 
formula leaves considerable room for risk selection. 
Capitation formulae based on prior costs seem to 
score well according to the four major criteria for 
evaluating alternative payment models mentioned by 
Epstein and Cumella [ 171: predictive performance, 
administrative feasibility, invulnerability to manipu- 
lation, and absence of adverse incentives. Prior costs 
appear to predict a substantial proportion of vari- 
ance, it is readily available in the Dutch case, it is little 
susceptible to manipulation (though some monitor- 
ing will undoubtedly be necessary), and implies few 
adverse incentives (as the impact of prior costs on 
future payments appeared to be only 25%). However, 
this adjuster scores poorly on an additional criterion 
that is important in the Dutch context of capitation, 
i.e., only those differences in costs between insurers 
should be accounted for that can be traced to differ- 
ences in (chronic) health status. The importance of 
this criterion lies in the fact that the influence on 
expenditures of, for example, prices, supply, propen- 
sity to consume, income, extent of insurance cover- 
age, and cost-containment policies, is, in the long 
term, supposed to be the responsibility of the health 
insurers themselves. Such factors would indirectly be 
taken into account when capitation payments are 
partly based on prior costs. 
A second problem with prior-year’s costs is, that it 
is subject to much random variation, i.e. it is a poor 
proxy of what we would actually like to measure, 
namely chronic health conditions. Using prior-year’s 
cost directly as an adjuster would mean compensating 
for self-limited illnesses, which is clearly not the 
intension of capitation. The solution may be to use 
past expenditures from longer periods rather than 
just one year, to identify more accurately those who 
are suffering from chronic conditions. For instance, 
it is likely that these people incur some expenditures 
(especially for outpatient care) each year because they 
are generally under regular medical surveillance. Fur- 
thermore, diagnostic information on non-discretion- 
ary past hospitalizations could be used as well. Such 
information may be incorporated in a capitation 
formula in the form of Diagnostic Cost Groups [4]. 
In the short term, prior costs of prescription drugs 
also could be considered as an adjuster because it has 
good predictive ability and seems administratively 
feasible. However, it may be vulnerable to manipu- 
lation and may promote adverse incentives. 
We conclude, as does Lubitz [22], that “for policy 
reasons the most practical adjusters at present are 
measures based on prior use of services”. In the long 
term, however, better adjusters have to be found to 
prevent risk selection and increase distributional fair- 
ness. Obviously, solutions to risk selection may also 
be found in additional procompetitive regulation like 
risk-related flat premiums, risk sharing between the 
Central Fund and insurers, qualification of insurance 
contracts, special arrangements for the enrolment 
procedure, monitoring of the quality of services and 
ethical codes for insurers. Such supplementary sol- 
utions are discussed in full by van de Ven and van 
Vliet [2]. 
In view of the above mentioned drawbacks of prior 
costs, it seems imperative that in the long term 
chronic conditions should be taken into account 
more explicitly. In an attempt to investigate the 
merits of this type of adjuster, we analyzed data from 
a health interview survey covering a representative 
sample of the Dutch population. The most compre- 
hensive capitation formula estimated on this dataset, 
comprising several indicators of health status such as 
physical impairments, self-rated health status, and 25 
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common chronic conditions (weighted by their-ex- 
pected costs), yielded an RZ value of 0.114, which may 
account for about 314 of the maximum achievable R’. 
In particular, chronic conditions appeared to have 
strong predictive ability. 
into account has virtually no effect on the major con- 
clusions. 
5. 
6. 
Various types of information that insurers might 
use to discriminate good and bad risks, given global 
capitation payments, were explored, usingthe survey 
data. The results showed that selection opportunities 
also lie in selective marketing (based on socio-econ- 
omit status), and in selection at enrolment (based on 
for instance health status). The estimated maximum 
selection profits reach approx 100% of (global) cap- 
itation payments in some cases. That is, by using 
information on, for example chronic conditions to 
select risks, insurers are, in theory, able to evade 
losses of about 100% on the capitation payments for 
individuals who represent a bad risk. In practice, 
these gains would not be realised completely because 
of selection costs, both financially and in terms of 
reputation, which were not taken into account. How- 
ever, given a global capitation payment, the potential 
profits are so high and can be obtained so easily that 
it is highly unlikely that insurers will not yield to the 
temptation to engage in selection. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
About half of these dropouts concerned people who 
were compelled to switch to the (compulsory) sickness 
fund insurance and about 5% were people who died. 
Welch W. P. Rearession toward the mean in medical 
care costs, impli&ions for biased selection in Health 
Maintenance -Organizations. Med. Care 23, (II), 
1234-1241, 1985. 
Lubitz J., Beebe J. and Riley R. Improving the Medi- 
care HMO payment formula to deal with biased selec- 
tion. In Advances in Health Economics and Health 
Services Research (Edited by Scheffler R. M. and 
Rossiter L. F.), Vol. 6. JAI Press, London, 1985. 
Beebe J. C. Medicare reimbursement and regression to 
the mean. Hlth Care Finan. Rev. 9, (3). 9-22, 1988. 
In this respect he (intended) capitation of health insur- 
ers in the Netherlands differs from the AAPCC: the 
former should, ideally, only account for health status 
because ffects of other risk factors are supposed to be 
the responsibility of the insurers whereas in the AAPCC 
such factors may play a role as well because it should 
equate the costs that beneficiaries would have had in the 
fee-for-services ector. 
IO. 
II. 
Assuming that the health indicators available in the 
survey dataset, and the information on total prior 
costs available in the panel dataset, explain to some 
extent different portions of the variance in health care 
expenditures [23], the above summarized results 
suggest that a capitation payment based on both 
health indicators and prior costs will prevent risk 
selection to a great extent. 
12. 
An Appendix to this article containing the details of 
these analyses, is available from the authors upon 
request. 
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